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objectives? What policy interventions work most effectively to close the substantial gap which exists
between the democratic promise and performance of the news media as an institution?
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Chapter 9
Media in the peace‐building process: Ethiopia and Iraq
Monroe E. Price, Ibrahim al Marashi and Nicole A. Stremlau

The idea that one can consider a governance reform agenda in a post‐conflict society assumes
that there is “governance” and, in particular, governance that has about it a structure, preferably a
rational one. Our study could be said to be about outliers: states or contexts in, after, or before
conflict, where the governance agenda is merely a hope. The optimist views the democratic role of the
news media, in as many contexts as possible, as that of a watch‐dog, agenda‐setter and gate‐keeper.
We point to variables that influence how realistic the optimistic agenda may be, principally patterns of
evolution in political structure.
There is little that is static about the peace‐building process. The post‐conflict period can
extend for many years, particularly if fundamental issues have yet to be resolved. The complex state and
nation‐building processes cannot be seen simply as short transitional periods but may continue for
decades. Even if the post‐conflict period could be bounded, opportunities during this stage are, to a
great extent, shaped by media approaches both before and during the conflict. Here we focus on two
cases—Ethiopia and Iraq—that represent very different instances and stages of peace‐building.
Both countries have experienced significant violent conflict and have liberalized their media
systems to some degree. Ethiopia and Iraq are, however, at different points in the nation and state‐
building process. In Ethiopia, after a decades‐long civil war that ended in the early 1990s, pockets of
conflict continue. Fifteen years later, there are fundamental disagreements, particularly among elites,
about the constitution and the nature of the state. There has been no effective process of reconciliation
and the media has been deeply polarized, reflecting some of the divisions. In Iraq, the government’s
project to bring peace has been similarly complex. Despite recent progress, Iraq is still largely a country
in conflict where the central government struggles to set the national agenda and maintain peace.
We do not set out to directly compare Ethiopia and Iraq, but rather to ask similar questions in
the two contexts, in an effort to draw out some issues as to why a liberalized press after violent conflict
might not contribute to the governance agenda. Our bias is empirical. We need to ask what role the
media should play normatively in these societies, and how the media‐political relationship is actually
shaped in practice. On the political side, the question could be how the state and other actors have
sought to shape the media space, with what discourse or methods. More broadly, how has the process
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of reconciliation progressed? How has the government incorporated (or failed to incorporate) different
perspectives, how has it sought to engage with those that represent different viewpoints, and what is
the government's approach to dialogue?
Because the media in such environments often do not necessarily perform the watch‐dog, gate‐
keeper or agenda‐setter functions specifically assigned in the ideal, there is a need for a diagnostic mode
of thinking of these contexts We posit four questions: 1) Do the media facilitate a process of dialogue
between government and insurgents or between opposition groups or political parties, or a process of
power‐sharing? 2) Do the media help define the question “what is the nation”? 3) Does their functioning
contribute to a viable state capable of governing? And (reflected in the above three) 4) At a minimum,
are the media restrained from encouraging violent outcomes?
If power sharing and dialogue are keys to conflict resolution—as they seem to be in some,
though not all, contexts—then one question might be what media arrangements make dialogue more
effective, including dialogue leading to power sharing. And what media arrangements then maintain the
power sharing agreement that was put in place (by agreement or by imposition)”?
In terms of framing the state, or nation, Nancy Fraser has recently discussed some of these
issues.1 Originally, Fraser considered that it was important to look at the shift in thinking about justice
from redistribution to representation. But she has recently revised this to think about what she calls
the “who” factor, namely the frame in which issues of redistribution and representation are contained.
In thinking about conflict zones and structure of the media, this issue of the frame—in this instance the
nature of the entity which is to emerge or about which an architecture should be decided—is obviously
both the understood objective and the overriding complexity. In many (though not all) conflict zones,
the very definition of the frame is key to determining the approach to understanding the nature of the
media. The frame influences what would be considered pluralist and what remedy there is for intense
partisanship. The media are about the negotiation of the frame itself. The media have a central role in
providing this space and negotiating and articulating divergent perspectives—for example, by reflecting
reconciliation and building consensus on historical events—but the involvement of the state in
negotiation and dialogue is key.
In terms of media enabling government to govern, in 2006, the Crisis States Programme at LSE
issued a report called “Why Templates for Media Development Do Not Work in Crisis States.” This was a
somewhat controversial report, partly because it sought to part from orthodox approaches to the
functioning of the media (both press and broadcast) in conflict zones. Almost by definition, the situation
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of “governance” in a fragile state is itself in the balance. The process of elite coalition formation is
central to obtaining a context where there is an entity that can and does govern, and the role of the
media in this project is an important, often overlooked role. In a recent paper, James Putzel, one of the
authors of the LSE report, argues that in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, “Standard templates of
“good governance” involving the devolution of power and the promotion of private and non‐
governmental agents of development may be, not only inadequate to the challenge of state‐building,
but positively counter‐productive if not accompanied by singular efforts to support elite coalition
formation and significantly increase capacity at the level of the central state.”2
This process of elite coalition formation is closely linked to the idea of power‐sharing. Florian
Bieber, who has studied post‐conflict states in the former Yugoslavia, locates the systematic failures of
power‐sharing in “the lack of consensus among the political elites from the different communities over
the state and the institutional set‐up.” Bieber seeks to determine “the broader significance for our
understanding of accommodating diversity in post‐conflict societies.” Power‐sharing can be imposed
externally or reached by compromise (or a combination of various methods), with different results.
As to avoiding violence and preventing civil war, Donald Ellis3 and Robin Williams4 provide
detailed studies of how ethnic divisions in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were mobilized through
the use of media to activate ethnic identities for the gains of political elites, though they give only a
partial insight into the factors that motivate ‘conflict media. An International Media Support (IMS)
Report outlines several factors that encouraged the emergence of a conflict media in Rwanda: a strong
ideology; control over a mass medium/media; psychological preparation to hate; and a call to violence.5
A strong ideology is propagated by prominent academics, journalists or politicians who develop theories
of their ethnic or sectarian group. Such theories in the media portray their group as a ‘stronger race’
and ‘a race with a glorious past,’ or as ‘victims’ who have to unite in order to deal with a threat posed by
other groups so that they will not be ‘eliminated’ from the political process or annihilated from within
the state altogether. In the final case, violence conducted by one community against the other is
portrayed as a matter of self‐defense. Without sufficiently considering the political and historical
context, or the role of the state, these frameworks risk characterizing conflicts as ‘tribal’ and the
expression of deep‐seated hatreds—a

simplistic presentation often employed by the media.

Nevertheless, these factors are useful in beginning to identify the emergence of conflict media.
We turn first to Ethiopia and then to Iraq as part of an ongoing study of how the media structure
relates to the factors we have set out, and how media development reflects or influences power
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structures. In both cases we have questions about who is participating in the nation‐building project,
whose definitions and historical visions are being reconciled, and who is competing for power. The
media are not only active participants but also reflect these processes.
In Ethiopia, we focus on the printed press, and in the case of Iraq, we focus on broadcasting.
Radio stations have strongly impacted the media landscape across much of Africa in interesting and
important ways, but Ethiopia has been excluded from this trend. Newspapers, however, set the media
agenda in the early 1990s when many African governments were changing and have retained their
importance across much of the continent. In Iraq, on the other hand, there has been a burgeoning of
both broadcasting and press in the post‐war period with radio and television having a strong impact.
Ethiopia
After seizing power in 1991, the Tigreyan People’s Liberation Front’s (TPLF) guerrilla commander
Meles Zenawi sought to differentiate himself from his predecessors and generate domestic and
international support for the new regime. One way he did this was through some liberalization of the
media space. A free press was compatible with the TPLF’s political ideology, Revolutionary Democracy,
and was also a response to domestic and international pressures calling for expanded political space.
Tolerating media freedoms helped the image of Meles as one of Africa’s New Leaders presiding over a
democratically‐inclined developmental state. There was a widespread hope that he, along with others
in the region, including Yoweri Museveni from Uganda, Isais Afeworki from Eritrea and Paul Kagame
from Rwanda, would bring about a broader African Renaissance. None of these leaders, however, has
relinquished control, and each still presides over a highly centralized autocratic regime.
Until the aftermath of contentious elections in 2005, Ethiopia’s press was vibrant but deeply
polarized. It served as a principal forum for expressing perspectives that diverged from the ruling party
on issues that have been dividing Ethiopian society for decades such as the rights of ethnicities, land
ownership and a federalist constitution. The post‐election period exposed critical failings in the nation
and state‐building project. In widespread violence, more than 100 people were killed, mostly by
government forces, and tens of thousands arrested. Dozens of journalists were jailed, as was a
substantial part of the leadership of the opposition Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) party. The
private press has largely been silenced and is no longer able to serve as the forum for alternative visions
of nation‐building it once did. In an effort to understand the role of the media in post‐war Ethiopia, we
will visit each of the four questions we have proposed for the media in post‐conflict environments,
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reflecting upon the critical decisions that were made in the early 1990s as well as the factors the led up
to the 2005 elections where the media space suffered a dramatic reversal.
Do the media facilitate a process of dialogue?
Despite the attempts by some in the media to negotiate different visions of Ethiopia, the
government, a crucial partner in any post‐war dialogue, has refused to participate in dialogue. The TPLF
saw little need to directly engage those whom it defeated, particularly those that were aligned with the
communist Derg regime that the TPLF overthrew.
Because the TPLF’s power base was located in Tigray, a region in northern Ethiopia with less
than 10 percent of the country’s population, the group had little choice but to form a multi‐ethnic
coalition. The Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) was formed by the TPLF
several years before it successfully defeated the Derg regime and came to Addis. In theory, the EPRDF
was to be an umbrella organization holding together different political parties representative of the
complex Ethiopian landscape. But not all opposition groups were eager to join the EPRDF and many
groups that did join became disenchanted quickly during the transitional period. Despite repeated calls
from those in the previous government, and others who felt excluded from the transitional government,
the TPLF pursued its own agenda with little compromise.

The TPLF also believed that tangible

development rather than persuasion or dialogue would convince the rest of the country of the merit of
its policies and leadership. This strategy emerged from the Front’s experience of convincing the
peasantry to join the struggle during the war.
The unilateral process of constitution‐making has polarized the press and continues to be a
deeply divisive and unresolved issue. Central to the TPLF’s struggle was idea that Ethiopia’s ethnic
diversity would be best served by a federal arrangement that would have at its core the right of
secession. The TPLF also made it clear that it planned to continue to control the executive committee
and entrenched its power ethnically within the military as at least 50 percent of the fighters were drawn
from Tigray. One of the first (and most contested) actions the EPRDF took when it first came to power
was to allow Eritrea to secede. 6 The move angered many and was seen as a unilateral and inadequately
consultative decision. Many of the early press commentaries called for a dialogue and national
discussion on federalism which to some Ethiopians was seen as destroying the Ethiopian nation‐state.
For example, in the early 1990s, in an effort to draw attention to their desire to participate in the
political discussions, as well as express concern, if not outrage, at the federalist arrangement, many
political groups came together for the Conference on Peace and Reconciliation. The government
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refused to engage, claiming there was no need for a “peace” conference in a country that was already at
peace, and labeling the participants as “anti‐peace.” Many of the newspapers were behind this
conference and actively supporting it. But the government was not willing to recognize the conference
or the recommendations and dismissed it as a demand by a “limited number of intellectuals.” Since
these early days the press continued calling for reconciliation, power‐sharing and more dialogue. In
some cases journalists represented the agenda of political parties that were critical of the EPRDF and in
others their motives were more personal and ethnically based.
Rather than negotiating or co‐opting opponents, the EPRDF simply ignored them or in some
cases tried to isolate them. This strategy further exacerbated an already tense period. Girma Beshah,
Mengistu’s former interpreter, spent several years in jail after the EPRDF came to power until he was
considered to no longer be a substantial threat. As he describes:
When the TPLF first came they didn’t know who was who. They locked us all up. A new
order was unfolding. It was not a new government but a new order, a new era.
Everything of the other regime was gotten rid of…. Sensitive places were taken over…
[they] didn’t want any interference or to coexist with anyone. That was the aspiration
of communism and Lenin’s [theory of] political cleansing ‐ getting rid of the Tsarists.
The EPRDF wanted to get rid of these people so they couldn’t have any feelings of the
past….Many of them lost their jobs in the state media. The government sent others to
retirement. So people thought it’s not a new government, but a new ethnic group. 7
Many of the journalists who lost their jobs went on to start private publications that were deeply critical
of the government.
Tobiya, one of the first newspapers that appeared after the EPRDF seized power, became one of
the most dynamic, experienced and influential publications in the immediate post‐conflict period. The
paper began in 1992 with 15 former journalists who had previously worked for the Ministry of
Information during the Derg as well as some who were outside the Ministry. The founders included
Mulugeta Lule, former editor of the Derg party’s8 magazine, and Goshu Mogus, who ran the censorship
office for the Derg. Mairegu Bezibeh, another journalist for Tobiya, spent a year and a half in jail on
charges of genocide for having executed 300+ people under the Derg but the EPRDF government could
not prove the case.9
The background of many of these journalists is key to understanding the role a substantial
portion of the press has played in Ethiopia, why the government has been reluctant to engage and why
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the press has been so polarized. First, the conflict between some journalists and EPRDF leaders dates
back decades to the student movement in the early 1970s. During this period contentious debates over
Marxist‐Leninist ideology were had and rifts between student groups (which included precursors to the
TPLF and the Derg) over issues such as the role of ethnic identities were evident. Second, after a long
guerrilla struggle, the EPRDF, when it came to power, felt little need to negotiate or include those that it
defeated or those that were also fighting the Derg at the same time since the TPLF “carried the others
on its shoulders.”10 Because the EPRDF did not consider it necessary to explain its actions or policies
domestically, Meles would seldom speak with or even acknowledge private journalists. Not only were
journalists of private papers unable to write balanced reports but the exclusion also contributed to a
deep level of frustration. By failing to engage with the private press, or the arguments themselves, the
government has done little create a political mainstream or facilitate a dialogue.
Do the media help to define the question of ‘what is a nation’?
In Ethiopia, a consensus on “what is the nation” has yet to be entirely established, partly
because the above‐mentioned dialogue between elite constituencies—including the press and those in
power—failed to occur.
The government press has been strongly propagandistic and has not even acknowledged
alternative positions on key policies. But since its establishment in the early 1990s the independent
press, including Tobiya, has been presenting contrasting visions of the Ethiopian state. This segment of
the press has come to reflect the political divisions of the disenfranchised ethnic groups, particularly the
Amhara, who dominate the intellectual class and were the major force in Ethiopian politics for
generations. For the many private journalists who see national identity as a single Ethiopia of “one
people” that was built by the imperial regimes, the EPRDF’s deconstruction of this idea has been deeply
disturbing and something that they continue to address.
The editorial policy of Tobiya on this issue was clear. According to Derbew Temesgen, a
founding journalist, “the editorial policy was against ethnic politics and against the separation of Eritrea.
Ethnic politics is not good for the unity of the country.”11 The papers and magazines consistently argued
against the right to secession and often accused the Ethiopian government of allowing Eritreans to
intervene in, if not overtly control, local affairs.12 The paper would also argue for reconciliation or a new
spirit of forgiveness,13 as well as suggest that the current government should be held as accountable for
current violations of human rights as it was aspiring to do for former leaders of the Derg.14 Indeed, early
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editorials and articles emphasize this line. The following example illustrates the arguments that were
common in the early months of publication:

The attempt by the fascist Italians to divide the people and the country was not
successful, but now it is getting rooted thanks to the current regime. The people of the
country are being divided along ethnic lines… The 1991 Charter follows and adheres to
the secessionist ideology of a few Eritreans….The attempt to view unity as a marriage is
very simplistic and incorrect. The people of Ethiopia are connected by history, nature,
culture and psychological make‐up…. We also think that no group should be allowed to
disintegrate the country. In the new Ethiopia, the unique and terrifying term is “unity.”
The charter is not in favor of unity…. The regime supports the division and disintegration
of the country and we think this is the first national government to do such a thing in
the world.15

While private press has been effective in discussing issues of national identity, the system as a
whole has been too polarized to set or define a national agenda. Much of the failure lies with the
government for refusing to engage in these serious discussions or to respond to the arguments
presented in the private press. Until the 2005 elections, the government thought such criticism was
relatively restricted to the literate elites in Addis Ababa. After the elections the government has felt so
threatened by these competing ideas that any possibility for such discussion is severely limited. Existing
papers are allowed to be critical of the government but only on the implementation of policies, not the
fundamentals of policies such as ethnic federalism. This is related to the third point of this analysis,
which looks at the contribution of the media in state‐building where we emphasize the role of the
government.
Do the media help to contribute to establishing a viable state capable of governing?
The private press has not been able to contribute to the goal that there is a viable state capable
of governing for two reasons. First, the government’s unwillingness to include the press in a national
project or engage in any sort of dialogue has limited the press’s potential role in state‐building. Second,
government press and propaganda efforts have failed to encourage trust and reconciliation, instead
increasing tensions and polarization. Successive Ethiopian governments have regularly modeled their
development strategies on the experiences of other countries.16

Ethiopia’s present vision of a

developmental state draws on the experiences of countries such as South Korea and Taiwan, where
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criticism and opposition parties are tolerated so long as they do not present a serious distraction to the
ruling party’s leadership, and, particularly, the state’s economic development.
Meles’s arguments on defining ‘fundamental policies’ clearly establish a precedent that debates
within the media are to center around issues of development, rather than political questions such as
the constitution or issues of secession, federalism, or land. In the School of Journalism,17 lecturers argue
that journalists should follow the developmental role of the media in China. Similarly, journalists and
the editors at the government media outlets emphasize their role in the economic development of the
country.
The EPRDF’s overall strategy for managing information flows is controlling the message from the
center to the periphery. ICTs, for example, have become a major tool for centralizing EPRDF control and
ensuring that cadres across the country are on message. This communication, though employing an
interactive mechanism, is largely one‐way. Meles or another party leader disseminates a message
through video conferencing or through local officials who are ‘trained’ in party ideology. Since 2005,
there have been some efforts to use ICT, through a project called WoredaNet, as a way to facilitate two‐
way communication with local officials offering reports to regional heads about the situation within
their area but this has not been the government’s focus.
Overall, the EPRDF’s basic information strategy targets the peasantry. This has received a
greater push in the aftermath of the 2005 elections. There are parallels between the current strategy as
well as the pre‐2005 strategy and the strategy used during the guerrilla war. The EPRDF is currently
focusing on “the advanced elements of the rural community” or those farmers that are more receptive
to party ideals. These people are then organized into small groups that receive training and serve as a
source of information but, most importantly, as conduits for developmental messages.

At the

grassroots level, information is not theoretical; the “advanced elements of the rural community” are
encouraged to get rich and then help others to get rich. In this context, radio is used for disseminating
“best practices” of development—particularly agriculture.
The focus on the peasantry has, however, come at the expense of some groups including
intellectuals and members of the previous government. With little desire or strategy to engage such
critics, the failure of negotiation of power and voice has exposed dangerous rifts in the state‐building
process, as most recently demonstrated after the 2005 elections.
Are the media restrained from encouraging violence?
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In the worst case the difficulties that the Ethiopian government has had in both making its own
propaganda successful and in managing non‐governmental flows of information effectively leads to
violent outcomes. In the aftermath of the 2005 elections, the media were so deeply polarized that both
the private and the government media exacerbated an already delicate situation and had a strong role
in provoking the violence as well.
While the private press was not overtly calling for violence the choice of words and discourse on
both sides amplified the tensions. The government propaganda is primarily aimed at people in the rural
areas whom it views as its real constituencies. But in the post‐election period, the government was
overwhelmed by the success of the opposition’s electoral gains and fearful of what the future held for
the ruling EPRDF. Thus, because the government lacked an effective communication strategy and since
it felt exceptionally insecure it turned to blatant pro‐government propaganda. This quickly became
counter‐productive, particularly among the private press and the opposition supporters whose
messages it was trying to counter.18 The Cambridge‐based scholar Christopher Clapham accurately
summed this up in his “Comments on the Aftermath of the Ethiopian Crisis” when he noted:
It is difficult to exaggerate the enormous amount of damage that has been done to the
EPRDF government by Bereket Simon, the former Minister of Information and now
information adviser to the Prime Minister, who has become the principal spokesman for
the government. His neurotic and consistently inflammatory pronouncements,
extending even to threats of an equivalent to the Rwanda genocide,19 have conveyed a
very clear impression, both to the opposition and to the outside world, that the EPRDF is
entirely unwilling to engage in any normal or reasonable political process.20
The issue of polarization and ethnic divisiveness in the press during the elections has been complex.
While it is true that many of the private papers referred to the EPRDF as a minority‐led regime and
expressed grievances with its ethnic basis, the government also sought to manipulate the ethnicity issue
just.21 In many respects it appears, as Clapham suggests, that it has been the government itself that has
been exploiting and driving this issue. While ethnic violence could be a potential problem, it is far from
the government‐sponsored genocide in Rwanda. As Lisane Hezeb noted, in the debates “EPRDF’s
labeling of CUD as the Interhamwe of Rwanda is irresponsible.”22
Similarly, a journalist at the government’s Ethiopian News Agency corroborated this when he
recognized that:
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At the ENA we have been compiling our reports from the election. The reporting is
biased and you can visibly see the difference between pre‐ and post‐election
reporting…. The adjectives for the CUD [Coalition for Unity and Democracy ‐ the
opposition party] came after polling day. For the city riots there was an established
phrase ‘the street violence that was instigated by the CUD’‐ everything started with this
phrase. It has not yet been investigated yet we accuse them….23
Over the last year or so, the government has begun to recognize that it must communicate more
effectively if it wishes to remain in power but also reduce the possibility of political violence. This
strategy is part of its developmental agenda (and the renewed emphasis on communicating
development projects rather than politics) but is also evident in the continued closure of political space.
In 2008 the government has proposed new civil society legislation that will close many of the local
NGOs, and virtually all of the international ones, that work in the human rights and governance fields. In
addition, the government continues to restrict the flow of competing ideas, whether in the newspapers,
on the radios or in blogs. With this continued censorship the propensity for violence in the short‐term
may be hindered but in the long‐term the situation that provoked the violence in 2005 remains
unresolved. As the Ethiopian nation and state‐building project remains precarious it is likely that in the
future the media may re‐emerge as a force that will lead to even greater violence.
Iraq
Iraq presents an enormous contrast to Ethiopia. Among the many political variables that
appear, Iraq is an instance of “occupation” as compared to radical domestic change in Ethiopia; large
scale shifts in technology of media delivery in Iraq compared to milder technological change in Ethiopia;
and perhaps most important, the capacity of the powers in Ethiopia to seek to impose information
hegemony, even while harboring some pluralism, as opposed to the absence of authoritarian control
over media in post‐conflict Iraq. Iraq became a theater for competition among many influences (using
satellites, for example,) while in Ethiopia the media players were fewer though intense.
The availability of media in Iraq changed drastically with the 2003 war. Prior to 2003, media
options were limited: newspapers, and radio and TV stations, were owned by the state, and satellite TV
and internet could only be accessed by Ba’ath Party elites. Following the war, more than a hundred
newspapers emerged, reflecting political parties espousing everything from communist to Kurdish
nationalist to Islamist ideologies. Iraqi citizens can now access the internet, freely own satellite dishes,
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and access hundreds of terrestrial and satellite radio and TV stations broadcasting from within Iraq and
from the region.
In Iraq, the idea of a balanced and pluralistic media was established as a goal, first in the Athens
Conference that was held shortly after the U.S. invasion, but more important, in the key Coalition
Provisional Authority Orders 65 and 66, issued March 20, 2004, which articulated the generally‐accepted
objectives for an idealized post‐conflict media. Order 65 created a National Communications and Media
Commission (NCMC), designed, in part, to “encourage pluralism and diverse political debate”; Order 66
established the equivalent of a public service broadcaster (from the shell of state television). In 2004,
the NCMC issued an Interim Broadcasting Programme Code of Practice that provided standards to avoid
violence. For example, the Code provided that “Programmes shall meet with generally accepted
standards of civility and respect for ethnic, cultural and religious diversity of Iraq.” 24 Despite the efforts
to establish an “ideal” media system, the post‐war development of Iraq’s media indicates the difficulties
encountered in implementation in the context of a continuing conflict, in particular with relation to
issues of dialogue, the framing of the state, governance and the promotion of violence.
As Iraq pursued democratization after 2003, the post‐war chaos led to fractured identities based
on ethnic, sectarian and tribal divisions. The nation’s Shi’a, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkmens, and Christians
found themselves in a security vacuum within a fragile political system dominated by exile and
opposition organizations, for the most part formed along ethno‐sectarian lines. Facing weak state
institutions, Islamist parties in the government, as well as the opposition, augmented their power with
calls to nationalism. Political elites, opposition leaders and non‐state actors, employing methods of
patronage‐based politics that have characterized the Iraqi state since its formation in the 1920s,
mobilized ethno‐sectarian communities, enshrining the insecurity and warlordism based on primordial
identities.
The embattled government has been unable to effectively enforce media legislation or regulate
media outlets and media content, and unlicensed radio and TV stations have proliferated. When the
NCMC was established, and when its licensing mandate was implemented, little attention was paid to
the relationship between license applicants and power distribution within the society. The model for
issuing licenses was basically first‐come, first served, as long as applicants met prescribed standards.
Groups not meeting these standards also obtained media outlets to assist their cause through various
mechanisms, including self‐help, operating in an unlicensed manner, and satellite broadcasting without
a license.
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The result has been the positive, though accidental, emergence of a pluralized media sector. As
in other contexts in the wake of conflict and relatively new to independent media, ideal internal media
pluralism is hardly present.25 Most of the stations in Iraq are now independently owned, but they
operate as extensions of ethno‐sectarian political institutions. The dominant Arab media are owned by
Islamist parties, and various political factions, deeming it necessary to have a TV channel to convey
political propaganda and to inspire their constituents, have media outlets at their disposal. The largest
Shi’a, Arab Sunni, and Kurdish parties own satellite channels, Al‐Furat TV, Al‐Baghdad TV and Kurdsat,
respectively, that are viewed in Iraq and abroad.
During times of political stability among the factions, Iraq’s polarized plural media ownership
reflects that stability. During times of discord and disintegration, however, media polarization further
undermines the capacity of the weak state to govern, and the political parties have the capability of
reinforcing the country’s sectarian divisions. In late 2007, Iraqi Sunni Islamist factions and tribes began
to oppose the strict religious para‐state created by Al‐Qa’ida, eventually realigning themselves against
the terrorists. The tribes coalesced into the Reawakening Councils known as ‘Al‐Sahwa’ and managed to
bring relative stability to their areas, forcing Al‐Qa’ida elements to disperse and seek refuge in other
parts of Iraq. Once this conflict de‐escalated, so did the “war of the airwaves.” As of 2008, no Iraqi
channels have directly incited one party to violence, but nevertheless there are a multitude of channels
that form an ethno‐sectarian media landscape, reflecting the political structure that emerged in Iraq as
of 2003.
Studies conducted by the United States Institute of Peace on media in conflict states warn of the
capability of media becoming tools of warlords as a result of rushed and hastily‐conceived media plans.26
Izabella Karlowicz, in her work on media development in post‐conflict Balkans, warns that “unregulated
media may be dangerous and can encourage, rather than calm, nationalistic tendencies.” Karlowicz
highlights “the dangers of poorly planned assistance to the development of the Fourth Estate in post‐
conflict areas, which may cause an outburst of ethnic conflict rather than fostering peaceful
cohabitation.”27 Just such an “outburst of ethnic conflict,” or, in the Iraqi case, “ethno‐sectarian
conflict,” has become a reality.
The literature on ethnic conflict stresses that ethnic cleavages in deeply‐divided societies are not
precursors in and of themselves for intra‐state violence. Rather it is the mobilization techniques used by
political elites that engage communal groups and gear them up for an identity conflict.28 Jenkins and
Gottlieb define identity conflict as “any rivalry between two or more groups that define themselves in
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mutually exclusive terms that use a collective ‘we/they’ definition.”29 Political Islamist elites scapegoat
other communities as a strategy to legitimize their rule. In the Middle East, elites often blame the
“others” for problems, diverting attention from their own shortcomings. Such elites, it is argued,
“present themselves as loyal protectors of group heritage. By propagating ethnic ideologies that
dehumanize or devalue other groups, these ethnic entrepreneurs incite hatred and mobilize attacks.”30
This theoretical approach is valuable when it is born in mind that numerous ethnic groups in deeply‐
divided societies do not engage in organized political actions based on a collective identity basis.
Williams argues that a first requirement for a group to take part in a conflict is some sort of mobilization
based on a real or imagined grievance shared among the identity based group: “Without some sense of
grievance, people do not mobilize.”31 In fact, over centuries, Iraq’s Shi’a have followed a tradition of
political quietism, enduring or acquiescing to their lack of power during the Ottoman era and the
formation of the Republic of Iraq. It was only after 2003, when the Shi’a became full participants in the
political process, with access to political parties and the agencies of the state, that Shi’a political elites
emerged to move this group to action.
We turn now to the questions posed about the role of the media in post‐conflict environments
to understand how mobilization and patronage have affected media developments in Iraq.
Do the media facilitate a process of dialogue?
Iraq’s ethno‐sectarian media were established to represent positions to strong and polarized
sectors, not necessarily as instruments of dialogue, yet the pluralistic media environment that emerged
in the chaos of the post‐war period has allowed more dialogue to occur than would otherwise.
The political movements that took part in the January and December 2005 elections mobilized
as Kurdish, Shi’a and Sunni Islamist parties that maintained their own militias. These parties, as in most
nearly every conflict in a deeply‐divided society, were the first to organize and did well in post‐conflict
elections.

The ethno‐sectarian factions, some radical in their nature, rallied support among the

populace on a platform of promising to protect each community’s identity‐based interests. One could
characterize the dynamic as “mediated patronage.” The parties demonstrated that they could provide
security for their own media, highlighting the successes of their security forces against the insurgents. In
this fray of mediated patronage, political parties and movements based on non‐sectarian platforms did
not have time to develop before the elections were held and thus could not provide this protection for
their constituencies; voters thus chose parties along the ethno‐sectarian divide.
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Thus, rather than seeking to promote or foster dialogue, the party and militia that owned each
channel promised protection from the inimical other and dominance in the political process. The parties
sought to employ agenda‐setting tactics to further their view on the role of Islam in the state, the nature
of federalism and how to maintain security, all of which are intimately related with issues of power‐
sharing. Federalism would augment the Kurds and Shi’a parties’ power, at the expense of Sunni and
Turkmen parties, while an Islamist state would augment the power of the Shi’a Islamist parties and
threaten the power of secular Kurdish parties. Thus, dialogue on these channels was hardly encouraged,
and contradicting viewpoints were neglected. The channels owned by political factions also failed to
foster dialogue by excluding guests from other communities on their political, social, or religious
programs. For example, religious programming on Sunni channels tended to host only Arab Sunni
clerics, and a political talk show on a Shi’a channel would primarily feature Arab Shi’a politicians.
Pluralism also allowed for an Iraqi media with no political affiliation and agenda to emerge;
these media are trying to provide an alternative to the Islamist media owned by ethnic Kurdish and
Turkmen or sectarian Shi’a and Sunni political parties. The Al‐Baghdadiyya TV channel has ensured that
guests on its program include Arab Shi’a and Sunni, Kurds, and Christians.
Do the media help to define the question of ‘what is a nation’?
This post‐2003 Iraq conflict emerged as an identity‐based struggle that failed to form a cohesive
Iraqi nation. The notion of an Iraqi nation is contested and still in flux. Arab Sunni parties tend to favor
the status quo, declaring loyalty to a centralized Iraqi nation that is part of the greater Arab world and
opposing plans for a future federated Iraq as a “foreign scheme” to divide the nation and leave them in
a landlocked rump state. The Shi’a and Kurdish parties tend to favor a bi‐national federation that
distances itself from the political conflicts in the region; the Kurdish parties’ vision seeks a Kurdish
Regional Government administering the multi‐ethnic, oil‐rich city of Kirkuk.

The state‐owned Iraqi Media Network constructed by the CPA under Order 66 had the
aim of reinforcing a national identity, but the ability to accomplish that goal was mired in banal
contracting and confused goals during the critical period of the channel’s formation. The IMN,
and its flagship station Al‐Iraqiyya, stands, though weakly, for a unified country, but its alliance
with the ruling party has called into question its ability to broker among candidates and parties.
According to its critics, the station, reflecting its relationship with the current government
(dominated by an alliance of Shi’a Islamist groups, known as the United Iraqi Alliance, and an
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alliance of ethnic Kurdish groups known as the Kurdish Coalition), has an inherent Shi’a‐Kurdish
bias. However, the station has tried to encourage dialogue by allowing more of its content to
be devoted to Arab Sunni and Turkmen guests, who use the channel to express their
grievances, if not criticize the government directly. Furthermore the station has attempted to
minimize the differences between Iraq’s Sunni and Shi’a by broadcasting live coverage of Friday
sermons where religious leaders from both communities preach against the nation’s sectarian
divide and stress “Iraqi unity.” It also holds televised meetings between Shi’a and Sunni leaders
as a means of inter‐sectarian dialogue.
The capacity to maintain an information hegemony with respect to defining the state was
strongly affected by the existence of the abundant private media. In post‐war Iraq, some private media
seek to stress the unity of Islam in Iraq, and forge a concept of a unified Iraqi nation. While the Shi’a Al‐
Furat channel has a distinct Shi’a leaning, it does not focus on issues of ethnicity. Songs in between
programs support peace and unity among Iraq’s various ethnic and sectarian communities, and the
station avoids direct references to the Shi’a as a distinct religious group, emphasizing Iraqi unity based
on an inclusive Iraqi Muslim identity. The news program rarely refers to Iraq as part of the “Arab world”
as do other Arab Sunni or independent Iraqi satellite channels. The Al‐Sumariyya channel produces its
own announcements that call for peace among Iraq’s communities. The station also features on‐the‐
street interviews with the Iraqi public, and interviews with program guests, who stress unity among
Sunni and Shi’a. Al‐Baghdadiyya stresses that it seeks to promote Iraqi culture and to urge Iraqis “to
unite” through various advertisements and music clips.
Alongside these calls for unity, private Iraq media with ownership in the hands of competing
political Islamist and ethnic factions reflect these conflicting ethno‐sectarian agendas. While no party
seeks to break up the Iraqi nation, each party argues that it is best suited at the helms of power, and
knows what is best for Iraq. Paradoxically, while each party stresses its commitment to Iraqi unity, the
ethno‐sectarian media have exhibited the potential to further the gap between Iraq’s communities and
weaken any kind of national belonging. While none of Iraq’s ethno‐sectarian parties sought the state’s
partition during the most intense periods of the sectarian conflict, their media ultimately served the goal
of enhancing the power of the parties that owned them. The result that emerged was not a national
media sphere, but ethno‐sectarian media ‘spherecules’ further developing identities along sectarian
lines and setting the country on a course of partition in terms of identity. Iraqis who watch only Shi’a,

16

Sunni or Kurdish channels may have communal loyalties to begin with, or these channels can further the
formation of communal identities. Regardless, these channels do provide the visual imagery and
rhetoric to make more concrete sub‐national identities.
Do the media help to contribute to establishing a viable state capable of governing?
As a public service broadcaster Al‐Iraqiyya is inclined to portray the vision that there a viable
state capable of governing. As a result, the channel’s programming features mostly pro‐government
programs that stress “optimism” in the progress being made in “reconstruction” and “security.” In its
depictions of violence, the station’s pro‐government line is represented with features on the operations
of the Iraqi security forces give viewers the impression that they are taking an active role in quelling
insurgent and sectarian violence. The channel also seeks to frame state violence as legitimate by
featuring public service announcements calling upon the Iraqi public to volunteer information on the
“terrorists.”
At the same time, the channel provides a space for Iraq’s citizens to interact and communicate
with politicians and the government, providing an alternative for the acts of violence that are in
themselves protests against the Iraqi state. Shows include live call‐in segments where viewers can
direct questions about political affairs to government officials and political leaders. Programs also allow
representatives of the state to discuss elections, military operations and the agendas of various Iraqi
political parties, with studio audience participation.
Private channels not affiliated with political parties also offer the Iraqi citizen a civic forum to
address constructive criticisms to the Iraqi government through studio interviews or on‐the‐street
interviews or viewer call‐ins. For example, Al‐Sumariyya’s “Who is Responsible?” interviews Iraqi
citizens on the hardships they face, and then allow the invited guest on the show, usually a government
official, to discuss how they are dealing with these problems.
Because the Shi’a party that owns the Furat channel is dominant in the government, Furat’s
programs tends to frame violence in Iraq with a pro‐government stance, just as Al‐Iraqiyya does.
Programs on the Kurdish‐owned stations stress the progress of the Kurdish north, the ability of the
parties to provide security, and support for Kurdish members of the government.
On the far end of the spectrum, the case of the Al‐Zawra satellite channel, owned by Mishan Al‐
Jaburi, a renegade member of the Iraqi government, illustrates how unregulated, free media can pose a
danger to a post‐conflict state. Following Mish’an’s explusion from the National Assembly, the channel

17

evolved into a platform for insurgents, airing insurgent‐produced videos with footage of attacks against
multinational forces. When former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s death sentence was announced on
November 5, 2006, Al‐Zawra featured videos and songs supportive of the outlawed Ba’ath party, as well
as exhortations for Iraqis to join groups fighting the U.S. “occupation forces” and the Iraqi government
and its “sectarian gangs.”
Are the media restrained from encouraging violence?
After 2003, most Iraqi Islamist parties used their media to stress unity among Iraq’s
communities. From 2004 – 2007, and particularly following the February 2006 bombing of the revered
Shi’a Al‐’Askariyya shrine in the city of Samarra, however, when inter‐communal violence between Shi’a
and Sunni was at its highest, the various sectarian and ethnic factions used their media outlets to
legitimize the violence and portray their respective groups as victims, encouraging both Shi’a and Sunni
to defend themselves in the ensuing sectarian conflict.
Shi’a channels sought to inflame tensions by blaming Sunni Muslims for targeting their
communities. (This discourse does not target Iraq’s Sunni population per se, but rather attacks the
foreign Arab fighters who came to Iraq who subscribe to the Wahhabi or Salafist ideologies, and those
Iraqis who cooperate with them). The Shi’a channels provided a visual discourse that stressed notions
of a past marred by “victimization,” and of a community “oppressed” since the Ottoman Empire and the
creation of the Iraqi state. Such suffering culminated under Saddam Hussein’s rule. Victimization was
also expressed after suicide attacks on the Shi’a religious Ashura processions and after attacks on Shi’a
shrines. Shi’a channels have called upon the Shi’a to have faith in the security forces (most of whom are
Shi’a) to restore stability. Furthermore, the Shi’a media have expressed a sense of abandonment by the
predominantly Sunni Arab world. Al‐Furat TV, owned by the largest Shi’a party, covers inter‐sectarian
violence against Iraqi Shi’a Muslims, although the station does not advocate revenge but rather patience
and obedience to those Shi’a leaders who have called for restraint. Another example is the show
“Deported in The Homeland,” which profiles internally‐displaced families (most of whom are Shi’a,
evidenced by the last names of those interviews and the phrases used) who have relocated due to
sectarian violence.
On the other side, the Arab Sunni discourse focuses on a notion of “disempowerment” wurse
also expresses a sense of “victimization” at the hands of U.S. “occupying forces” and the “militias,” a
euphemism for Shi’a death squads that operate privately or within the Iraqi security forces. For
example, Sunni Islamist channels highlighted, if not glorified, insurgent attacks against U.S. forces (this
practice ended after the parties entered into an alliance with the Iraqi government). A dominant frame
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on Al‐Baghdad is “resistance” to the U.S military forces, referred to as “occupation forces.” This view of
violence in Iraq mirrors the Arab Sunni Accord Front’s. Unlike Al‐Iraqiyya or Al‐Furat, this station refers
to insurgents as “armed men” rather than “terrorists.” It did not incite violence, but did legitimize non‐
state violence.
While channels like Al‐Zawra directly incited violence, and provided a channel for insurgents to
air their broadcasts, channels with no political affiliation have refused to air any material that incites
ethnic or sectarian divisions. For example, Al‐Sumariyya, which claims non‐affiliation with any sectarian,
ethnic or political party, does not carry live statements or press conferences of any Iraqi politicians,
indicating the station’s effort to maintain its neutrality. Al‐Diyar rarely shows live footage of the
aftermath of insurgent attacks; its news programs usually focus on domestic news, with an emphasis on
social affairs rather than violence.
Following the violence that ensured after the 2006 bombing of the Al‐’Askariyya shrine, the
various sectarian and ethnic media outlets eventually called for restraint among Iraq’s communities, and
tensions further de‐escalated by 2007 with the closure of Al‐Zawra.
Conclusions
This has been a study in contrasts in terms of control of information, stability, nation‐building
and maturation of political institutions. What we think is clear, however, is that a reformulated grid of
press functions needs to be defined in post‐conflict contexts. It is not enough to say that the media
should serve the roles established in the ideal of watchdog, agenda‐setter and gate‐keeper. But in order
to understand these adjusted or altered roles, one must examine the players affecting the media market
and their goals. Ethiopia and Iraq present two very different, examples of the role the media can have
in the nature of post‐conflict governance, with the media in each case either reflecting or exacerbating
the divisions and coalitions of elites or other groups.
By looking at select examples of these cases through the framework presented in the paper, it
becomes evident that capacity to govern, stability, and the nation‐building project can be anterior or
even superior to the media’s role in promoting democracy or good governance.

Understanding the

media’s potential for encouraging the development of a stable state is a key part of promoting peace.
And while the media reflect the political processes—including that of reconciliation and the
development of a government (either coalition or minority led)—they also have a role in these
processes. While it can be useful to suggest, as the normative governance agenda does, that journalists
should be ‘watchdogs’ of the government, focusing on that role leaves little room for understanding
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the complex ways in which journalists see their work. Journalists often have nuanced roles in the nation
and state‐building exercise which cannot be easily divorced from the political realities.
In both Ethiopia and Iraq, it is evident how quickly after a conflict the media can both reflect and
negotiate the process of dialogue and power‐sharing. For a ‘free media’ system to be an effective part
of the nation‐building project, government involvement is required. The leadership has a responsibility
to participate in this ‘elite sphere’ by responding to criticisms and debates. If it fails to do so, as has
been the case in Ethiopia, the media can contribute little to reconciliation and polarization, which both
reflects and is part of the political process, has little chance of being mitigated. We do not argue that
polarization is necessarily part of the post‐conflict period, but circumstances frequently mean that it will
be, and any theory of post‐conflict environments must accommodate that likelihood.
This paper has dealt with states that deploy language of democratic aspirations, but are not
comfortably capsulized as “democratic,” nor at peace. Both are engaged in a continued nation‐building
process. Each is a messy, nonlinear project. If Ethiopia offers any indication, the process of conflict and
conflict resolution in Iraq will continue for years; evidence of a “free press” is only a sign, and not
necessarily a convincing one, for those wishing it on a “democratic” trajectory.

Examples from

elsewhere do provide some suggested indications of how to mitigate the chances that a polarized media
system exacerbates the potential for instability and violence. In each case the structure of the media
must be seen in relationship to the political process—the consolidation of power, reconciliation, power
sharing, the relationship between present, future and past regimes and their efforts at state‐building
and extending power.
All this must be kept in mind in considering what, if any, relationship might exist between the
media and a governance agenda. The nature of the crisis and the complexity of the factors at play
indicate why polarized media or government control are often the outcome in these contexts, as well as
why prevention of violence, the framing of the state and the contribution to dialogue and conflict
resolution are so significant in describing the way the media function.
Policies should also recognize this reality and work to understand the polarization in the broader
processes of nation‐building, what opportunities can be taken from the situation and how best all actors
should engage in the circumstances. The emerging state can have a strong role in defining the frame of
the nation, but polarization and segmentation may make that problematic. We have emphasized the
“blur” that characterizes pre‐conflict, conflict and post‐conflict resolution. One way of increasing the
opportunities that may be available to engage with the polarized media is to deepen an understanding
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of how the government and parties are approaching the information sphere based on their prior
experiences of communication, persuasion and political ideologies.

It is usually only the normative

governance agenda that assumes a break and fresh start post‐conflict; the reality for the actors on the
ground is typically more complex and bears the burden of continuity.
External goals are to achieve governments that can govern—fairly, and with legitimacy, progress
toward democratic values, and an agenda that leads to just outcomes in economic and social progress.
The paper hopes to contribute to understanding this process, starting by understanding contexts where
the goals, to varying degrees, seem remote.
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